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ABSTRACT 
The essay examines Spain’s colonial legacy in the long run development of Spanish America. 
It surveys the fiscal and constitutional outcomes of independence and assesses the relative 
burden imposed by colonialism. Constitutional asymmetries between revenue collecting and 
spending agents constrained de facto governments’ power to tax. Inherent disparities 
embedded in the colonial fiscal system worsened with vaguely defined representation for 
subjects and territories and vexed their aggregation into a modern representative polity.  
Governments with limited fiscal capacity failed to deliver public goods and to distribute the 
costs and benefits of independence equitably. Growing indirect taxes, debt and money 
creation allowed them to transfer the fiscal burden to other constituents or future generations. 
Taxpayers realise the asymmetry between private contributions and public goods and hence 
favoured a low but regressive taxation. Comparisons with trajectories in the metropolis and 
the US are offered to qualify this legacy.  
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RESUMEN 
El articulo examina el ‘legado’ del colonialismo español en el desarrollo de Hispanoamérica 
en el largo plazo. Discute el resultado fiscal y constitucional de la Independencia y estima la 
carga de la extracción relativa impuesta por el fisco colonial. Asimetrías constitucionales en 
los agentes que recaudaban impuestos y ejecutaban el gasto limitó de facto la capacidad fiscal 
de los gobiernos. Disparidades inherentes al propio sistema fiscal colonial agravaron esta 
poca capacidad con una representación política de súbditos/ciudadanos y territorios ambigua 
que problematizó su agregación posteriormente en un sistema político independiente 
cabalmente representativo. Gobiernos con capacidad fiscal limitada fracasaron en la 
provisión de bienes públicos y en la distribución equitativa de los costos y los beneficios de la 
independencia. Impuestos indirectos crecientes, deuda y creación de dinero permitieron a los 
gobiernos transferir el peso fiscal a otros sujetos políticos que los propios o a futuras 
generaciones. Los contribuyentes entendieron estas asimetrías entre contribuciones privadas y 
bienes públicos de modo de que favorecieron una baja pero regresiva fiscalidad. La 
comparación con la trayectoria fiscal de la ex – metrópolis y los Estados Unidos permiten 
ofrecer una calificación de este legado colonial. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper takes issue with institutionalist models to discuss the notion of colonial legacy in 
setting the development path of Latin America
1
, delving into the history of colonial Spanish 
America and searching for another possible set of institutions which might well explain Latin 
America’s economic development. It builds on previous research on the political economy, 
taxation and governance of the Spanish Empire and echoes other assessments of the region’s 
economic performance in the post-independence period. Thus it revisits the notion of Spanish 
colonialism current in the institutionalist literature. Following their rationale it addresses the 
question of why, if colonial rule was so prejudicial for development, independence did not 
change that path. It also investigates the extent to which this is a history of bad colonialism if 
it was the case that the metropolis suffered badly from the same malaise – for most of the 19th 
century at least – and to what extent fundamentals of the colonial political economy remained 
in place after the end of Spanish rule.  In so doing, an analytical argument is offered on the 
                                                          
1
 Broadly this refers to well-known research by Acemoğlu, Johnson and Robinson and Engerman and 
Sokoloff (various dates). 
channels and mechanisms of persistence; one of the main aspects of the institutionalist 
interpretation.  
 
Section I briefly describes the governance, the economic basis and workings of the colonial 
state which permitted the territorial expansion of the empire and organized the economy 
under its control. Section II discusses the exogenous shock resulting from the Napoleonic 
occupation of Spain in 1808, which inflicted a fatal blow for the continuation of the rule and 
triggered major reforms in both Spain and in the colonies on its wake. It discusses 
interpretations of the colonial fiscal burden –and its release- as the legacy of independence. 
Section III offers some first estimates of the subsequent fiscal burden and surveys the 
institutional changes affecting taxation and representation which transformed the political 
fundamentals of Spanish rule. Focusing on the changes initiated with the Cadiz constitution 
of 1812, it compares fiscal and financial developments in the colonies and the metropolis to 
point out the debatable nature of a colonial legacy since both suffered very similar problems 
– and sought very similar solutions. Section IV analyses institutions of taxation and political 
representation in the US before and after the Revolution to highlight the differences in fiscal 
and political matters with Spanish America - making the US a problematic yardstick to assess 
the institutional determinants of long run development comparatively. The paper concludes 
with another institutional argument – different from the colonial origins- pointing at another 
type of legacy that shaped the long run economic performance of Spain and her former 
colonies; that is the inconsistency between taxation and representation in the constitutional 
setting implemented in the 19
th
 century which ultimately engendered persistent 
macroeconomic instability with detrimental consequences visible to date.   
 
1. SPANISH COLONIALISM 
A cursory characterization of the economy in this section qualifies some claims made 
concerning the nature of Spanish colonialism. As shown elsewhere, the governance that 
Spain established in the New World relied heavily on the local agency of co-opted subjects, 
individuals and corporate. The economic structure organized by Spaniards relied on a 
disproportionately high land / labour ratio exacerbated by the collapse of the native 
population in the 16
th
 century, a demographic shortfall roughly three times more dramatic 
than the one caused by the Black Death. The population took more than two centuries to 
rebound to pre-conquest levels as recovery was constantly held back by epidemics. By 1800 
the population of frontier regions such as Northern Mexico, Chile, Venezuela and the River 
Plate was increasing more quickly as these were the fastest growing regions at the time 
together with Cuba – which, thanks to African labour, constituted another dynamic frontier in 
the empire.  
 
A great deal of local autonomy in the governance of colonial cities and villages replicated 
Spain’s institutional order and structure of representation found in her pueblos and towns 
(Quijada 2008). Citizenry was local and the commonwealth organized in a corporate order led 
by local notables. Spanish rule relied on overlapping and competing authorities, secular and 
religious, administrative and judicial, locally appointed (or purchased) and confirmed by the 
king, which checked each other out. The constant bargaining between bodies and individuals, 
i.e. the governor and the bishop, the bishop and the religious orders, the governor and the 
courts (audiencias), made the king in Spain Hispaniarum et Indiarum Rex the authority of 
last resort; he conceded legality to contracts and was the ultimate arbiter in disputes between 
subjects, cities/towns and corporations
2
. By incorporating traditional institutions of authority 
and conflict resolution indigenous people or pueblos (lit. towns) enjoyed equal status to 
Europeans before the king though were separated by their own judicial freedoms. As the 
ecclesiastics, the military, the guilds of merchants and miners, the indigenous pueblos 
enjoyed judicial and fiscal privileges (fueros, aforamientos) and were thus unequal before the 
treasury
3
. This did not make the colonial society more equal; it is simply that distinctions 
were not purely established by colour.  
 
By the mid-18
th
 century taxes on external and domestic trade provided most fiscal revenues. 
Mining as such was never the main source of royal income as it was a private venture and the 
burden from direct royal taxes was somewhat offset by the royal subsidies on quicksilver. 
(Grafe and Irigoin 2006). A significant amount of revenue was redistributed within the territory 
to settlements both near and far such as Cuba, California, Concepcion and Manila. This 
provided working capital for new economic activities and attracted trade to the ports; it 
financed the expansion of the empire and sustained the growth of existing cities and of the 
private mining enterprise. Unlike other European empires, this was a self –and abundantly- 
financed economy, which had continued expanding over the territory since early in the 16
th
 
century.  
                                                          
2 From Latin arbiter, judge, supreme ruler in use in Medieval France and England. 
3 Unlike the situation in the US, being black did not necessarily mean being a slave and the first minority 
everywhere was free people of mixed races. These features challenge the triple colour division of the 
colonial population in {Sokoloff, 2000 #133} table 3. 
 Elsewhere this state has been characterized as ‘developmentalist’ as it was deeply embedded 
in the local economy and originated significant re-distributive effects in its expansion (Grafe 
and Irigoin 2012); central or metropolitan control was rather limited as was its rate of fiscal 
extraction to Spain. Revenues broadly defined as ‘from the Indies’ never accounted for more 
than a fifth of metropolitan revenues in the 18
th
 century. Yet these amounts pale when 
compared with the money collected in the empire, as shown in graph a. The proportion 
directly appropriated by the Spanish king represented a few percentage points of the revenue 
generated in the colonies.  Only the lack of a comparison of relative values could give the 
impression that there was any sizable ‘extraction’ of revenues. Such was the wealth of the 
Spanish American economy.  
 
Figure 1 – (Please see published version for image) 
Contribution from the Indies to the Spanish Treasury and total and net revenues in mainland 
America – in thousands of silver pesos 
 
Source:  data ‘from Indies’ and ‘from Spain’ (Marichal 2008) table 1.1 Appendix; America gross and net 
revenues from Grafe & Irigoin (2006, 2012) table 1. Conversion rate between reals de vellon and the Spanish 
American silver peso was 20:1 as indicated by Marichal.  
 
Colonial administration was in private hands; extended sale of office plus tax collection and 
spending outsourced to merchants or miners’ guilds, local priests, and tax farmers all resulted 
in the near privatization of fiscal functions on the one hand, and the supply of public goods 
by the church on the other, all of which placed a significant amount of control of the state 
business in local hands. Little European migration went directly to newer remote areas; rather 
old settlements were the springboards from which population and capital were raised to move 
further inland. This Smithian type of growth expanded the private economic activities 
engaged in the production and trade of natural resource-intensive goods. In so doing the 
colonial state was also expanding its fiscal base with the progressive creation of treasury 
districts. Unlike the process of aggregation or mergers in the European (and US) path to state 
formation, revenue collection points multiplied over time in Spanish America. This process 
accelerated in the 18
th
 century with population growth - hence the fiscal subdivision of 
Mexico and the River Plate - a feature that qualifies the notion of the Bourbons’ greater 
centralization. Spending was also controlled by locals as imperial defence was organized and 
run by locally organized militias (Grafe Irigoin 2012). 
 
The extraction by the colonial state should not be equated to the economic exploitation that 
Spaniards imposed on the New World; Spanish colonialism was indeed a highly private 
enterprise, locally run and heavily subsidized by the colonial treasury. Since the early 16
th
 
century the bulk of the specie sent to Spain was made up of private treasure, e.g. ‘emigrants’ 
remittances, savings of passengers and the bulk of it from the balance of trade’ (Hamilton 
1929)(463). The proportion increased together with more mining and trade. No chartered 
company was established to trade with America in the fashion of the other European 
companies – until very late and to little effect4, no monopoly exploited the production of 
silver within or its export outside America; the single direct royal stake in the mining 
economy was the provision of quicksilver crucial for the amalgamation of silver; nor had 
capital to be raised in the metropolis to establish a viable economic profit in the colonies - 
unlike most other European imperial ventures as pointed out by Adam Smith. Indeed, this 
was a very different political economy from that conceived by institutionalists. 
 
By the 1800s such a system of internal distribution of revenues was assisting the fast growing 
new regions. As pointed out by Summerhill (Summerhill 2008), fiscal transferences did 
                                                          
4 The Casa de Contratación did not own ships; it was actually a shipping agency for the private fleet 
convoyed over the Atlantic. The Real Compañia de la Habana briefly enjoyed the monopoly of trade with 
Cuba from 1740 to 1790, although its decline was noticeable as from 1763. A Basque trading company 
was chartered for the trade with Caracas in 1728 and was transformed into the Real Compañia de 
Filipinas in 1785. In 1776 trade at Caracas was liberalised.  
increase output because revenues were flowing from lower productivity areas to areas with 
potentially higher productivity as was the case of Cuba and the River Plate. Throughout, 
exports diversified beyond silver towards more land intensive commodities like wheat, 
copper, indigo, cochineal, tobacco, sugar, cacao and hides; and population – particularly in 
urban areas - was growing fast
5
. Customs yields in both colonies, for instance, increased 
tenfold between 1778 and 1805, and this should be considered a lowest bound for growth of 
commerce since trade with ‘neutrals’ and contraband was the norm. Both colonies ‘per capita 
GDP in 1800 was higher than the US’ (Coatsworth 1998) and higher than any other Spanish 
settlement at the time. It is a challenge to both endowments and institutional models to 
disentangle how colonies of the same empire with such a different set of endowments, free 
available land and low population in the temperate River Plate and tropical agriculture with 
slave labour in Cuba, could both stand out. Economic historians have adhered to the idea of 
trade openness, which somewhat characterised both export economies. Both, however, were 
also main recipients of large revenue transfers from other treasuries, which ought to lower the 
relative cost of capital locally.  Maps below show the relative importance of the intra-colonial 
transfers as proportion of net revenues in each fiscal district.   
Figure 2a: New Spain 1796-1800. 
(Please see published version for image) 
 
Figure 2b: Peru, Upper Peru, Chile and River Plate, 1796-1800. 
                                                          
5 Cuba’s slave population grew at 3.7 % per year and its free population at 2% between 1774 and 1792. 
(Grafe Irigoin, 2006 p 259). Annual growth rates in Buenos Aires were respectively 1.8% and 3.2%  
{Johnson, 1979 #1312}. 
     
(Please see published version for image) 
 
When other European powers threatened the colonies in the 1760s investments for defence 
demanded a greater tax take from the economy; without a centralized administrative structure 
and scant control of its bureaucracy, further spending required the empire a greater state 
autonomy with which to extract more – i.e. greater state capacity. In order to extract more, 
the metropolitan government had to gain control over collection from vested interests or find 
new sources
6
. It tried both. This is, in a nutshell, what the so-called Bourbon reforms sought 
and to which the establishment of monopolies was decisive. The extension of monopolies on 
price inelastic goods such as tobacco in the 1760s substantially increased revenues in districts 
such as Mexico, Puebla, Guanajuato, Havana, Manila, Santiago de Chile, Caracas, Santo 
Domingo and Quito. Start-up capital for the production and distribution of tobacco on an 
imperial scale originated in Mexico’s treasury transfers. This improvement however did not 
stop the dissipation of revenues into private hands. The running  costs of Mexico’s tobacco 
factory consumed 50% of its income ((Deans Smith 1992) p54).  
 
                                                          
6 As early as 1787 Carlos III felt hopeless about the resistance to the (failed) implementation of the 1749 
Unica Contribución levy in Spain. Cited in (Fontana, 1987 p 2). 
Between 1730 and 1780 the number of fiscal districts doubled from 36 to 71 – at least in the 
region covered by TePaske & Klein’s sample. An excise tax, the alcabala, was extended to 
products and taxpayers formerly exempted; the rate was increased too, but its collection 
remained farmed out to individuals and local corporations such as the Cabildo in Puebla or 
the Consulado in colonial capital cities. Constrained by the very (unwritten) constitutional 
structure and centuries of – in practice - limited government, imperial rivalries ironically 
pushed the Spanish king to greater dependence on his wealthy colonial subjects.  Colonial 
treasuries borrowed heavily from local subjects –in various ways - particularly from the 
1780s (Marichal 2008, Grafe Irigoin 2012, (Grieco 2014). Marichal (2008) argues that 
colonials’ contribution to metropolitan finances bankrupted the Mexican treasury. He is not 
conclusive however regarding the degree by which local vested interests might have profited 
from such ‘extraction’. Under Charles III treasuries extracted a larger amount of revenues but 
at the same time expenses increased even further. Even if they were only partly appropriated 
by colonial stakeholders the ‘reforms’ brought locals substantial opportunities to cream off 
the newly expanded fiscal capacity. A rough calculation in table 1 – considering the partial 
nature of the data- shows the impressive growth of fiscal income and spending throughout the 
18
th
 century.  
 
Table 1 total revenue, expenses and transferences to Spain and America, selected years in 
pesos 
  annual  annual  annual  annual 
 total 
revenue 
growth total 
expenses 
growth to America growth to Spain growth 
1691-
95 
43,195,438  43,219,682  13,059,053   
5,047,838 
 
1729-
33 
50,394,431  
0.4 
52,145,319  
0.5 
13,854,670  
0.2 
 
5,548,888 
 
2.66 
1785-
89 
255,194,445  
2.9 
220,817,011  
2.56 
92,207,404  
3.4 
 
11,791,137 
 
1.4 
1796-
800 
413,710,965  
4.5 
384,517,409  
5.17 
124,655,854  
2.8 
 
21,591,802 
 
5.7 
Source (Grafe Irigoin, 2012) 
 
It seems paradoxical that intra-colonial transfers skyrocketed at the time when Madrid 
tightened metropolitan control; they represented a third of the total money collected and the 
proportion varied further within districts. Expenses grew even faster than revenues and 
despite the growth in royal remittances to Spain (not accounting for private monies
7
) the 
initial low levels make relative their importance in the total tax take.  Like Cuba and Buenos 
Aires, some regions benefited greatly at the expense of others according to their participation 
in the private-public partnership that managed the transfers (and the treasuries) in America. 
The diversion of income from more populated (more consumers) regions to coastal (trading 
overseas) and administrative centres is visible in table 3 below. Thus disproportion between 
costs and benefits among colonies was inbuilt in the system and it would inevitably create 
regional inequalities once the system failed.  
 
2. INDEPENDENCE 
This happened in 1808 when Napoleon forced the abdication of King Charles IV and 
imprisoned his heir, the future Ferdinand VII.  The population rejected the French surrogate 
king with crucial institutional consequences. The manoeuvre was preventing the legitimate 
ruler from ruling; without a proper succession mechanism as the sovereign was still alive, the 
rejection of an ‘illegitimate’ rule opened an unprecedented constitutional crisis. Spain waged 
its own ‘War of Independence’ in Europe. Representatives of all parts of the Spanish 
monarchy - including the colonies on equal footing with metropolitan Spaniards- assembled 
in Cadiz to establish a provisional government of sorts. This congress hurried through a 
constitution in 1812 altering the nature of the political regime towards a somewhat 
representative constitutional monarchy, though the complete transition took the rest of the 
century.  
 
In America elections of deputies to the Cadiz Congress gave way to provisional governments 
in every sizable urban centre – most of them also treasury sites. With the need to establish a 
new sovereignty and some form of governance a number of political and constitutional 
experiments developed (Dye 2006). Between 1808 and 1830 fifteen future nations in South 
America sanctioned 46 constitutions
8
.  By 1825 most of them had turned into a republican 
form of government, some structured in a federal or confederal form, others centralized, but 
                                                          
7 Prados estimates the value of private silver in 1782-1807 around 16,000,000 pesos, an amount slightly 
lower than that of Spain’s commercial deficit {Prados de la Escosura, 1993 #1375} pp 263-264. 
8 Numbers do not include charters at subnational level. Source: political database EAW School of Foreign 
Service Georgetown University http://sfs.georgetown.edu/ accessed December 2014. 
for the most part these were mere words. Thus a centrifugal process of territorial 
fragmentation triggered the political, fiscal and finally monetary disintegration of the empire 
and the system of intra-colonial transfers disappeared altogether. Thereafter, competition for 
revenues and resources further prejudiced the loss of income from missing transfers; regional 
disparities evolved into civil war.  
 
What were the economic consequences of such an exogenous shock? Maddison’s data show a 
sharp fall in per capita GDP after 1820, which helps to explain why Latin America fell 
behind during post-independence (Coatsworth 1998). Prados (Prados de la Escosura 2009) 
challenges this notion as he argues that the region grew moderately on average and in this 
period outperformed other parts of the world with which a comparison is more realistic than 
using the US as a yardstick
9
. Two other arguments posed by Prados refer neatly to the legacy 
of Spanish colonialism. Namely 1) that net benefits from the release of the fiscal and trade 
burden imposed by the metropolis were offset by the costs of establishing an independent 
political regime and, a less surprising one, 2) that location and endowments prejudiced the 
efficient distribution of the expected gains from a ‘less costly’ integration into the world 
economy. These two issues are central to the argument on the fiscal developments resulting 
from the end of the colonial rule made in this paper.  
 
Prados is not conclusive regarding the extent to which the disappearance of the tax burden 
might have brought relief to the colonies. Representing 35% of total foreign trade between 
1783 and 1810, Spain’s loss of her colonies did not mean a major setback for her economic 
activity
10
. Marichal (2008, 54) estimates that the burden the empire laid with the Mexican 
taxpayer was 50% higher than what was paid by metropolitan subjects; 3.6 pesos per capita in 
America against 2.5 in Spain. In an earlier article Coatsworth (Coatsworth 1978) table 2) 
calculated that the losses for Mexico from restrictive Spanish policies amounted to 5 to 7.5 % 
of GDP representing a trade burden of 3% of GDP or 1.20 pesos per capita and a fiscal 
burden of 1.68 pesos per capita - equivalent to 4.2 per cent of GDP. This made the burden of 
Spanish colonialism ‘35 times greater than that of Britain’; yet the thirteen British colonies 
                                                          
9
 Without a systematic assessment the argument is repeated for some particular cases  {LLopis, 2009 
#1459} . 
10 Prados concludes that ‘fiscal insufficiency from a weak fiscal base together with the weakness of 
Spanish manufacturing at the time may explain the critical economic situation following the loss of the 
empire in mainland America’ (Prados, 1993, pp 284) my translation. 
embarked on a fiscal rebellion against the metropolis in the 1770s as a result and yet no 
equivalent reaction was ever recorded in Spanish America.  
 
All these authors expect that the release of such a burden should bring economic advantages 
to the independent governments. As Marichal (2008, 257) states  
 
 ‘If the external transfers (tax transfers to the metropolis and to other Spanish 
American colonies) had not been realized, New Spain’s annual tax burden would have 
been reduced …  This income, in the hands of the taxpayers, would certainly have 
generated greater consumption, but might also have increased savings .. With regard 
to savings, it may be presumed that wealthier groups would have increased their silver 
holdings or invested them in trade or enterprise’.   
 
The quality of comparable GPD data for all districts is very uneven so a different estimate has 
been constructed where robust population data are available.  Table 2 shows estimates for per 
capita net revenues and net expenditures, i.e. exclusive of all remittances to neighbouring 
treasuries and to Spain for the regions which would become independent republics.   
 
 
Table 2 
Gross and net
a
 per capita revenues and expenditure by 19
th
 century political aggregates 
 
 Revenue 
1785-89 
Revenue 
1796-
800 
Net rev
a
 
1785-
89 
Net rev
a
 
1796-
800 
Expend 
1785-89 
Expend 
1796-
800 
Net 
Exp
a
 
1785-
89 
Net 
Exp
a
 
1796-
800 
Mexico 7.90 11.60 6.13 9.15 5.62 11.14 2.57 6.94 
Chile 1.71 5.25 1.21 5.11 1.40 2.80 1.28 2.78 
River 
Plate 
6.90 8.42 3.16 4.29 5.38 7.67 4.87 7.16 
Bolivia 5.47 6.25 4.31 4.33 3.85 4.14 1.85 1.73 
Peru  5.39 3.51 4.49 2.28 3.80 3.09 2.98 2.00 
          
 Spain    3.17
b
   2.77 5.59 
Source: (Grafe Irigoin, 2012) table 1 Notes a) Net of transfers to Spain and other colonies; b) data for 1800 
 
By the end of the century the fiscal burden had increased in Mexico, but per capita net 
expenditure – exclusive of transfers- grew even more. Largely privately managed, substantial 
remittances to Cuba, other Caribbean posts and territories in today’s US, ought to render 
economic benefits to some (if not to the average) Mexicans. There is plenty of qualitative 
evidence showing the participation of Mexican merchants in the management, transport and 
apportioning of these remittances: the financing of the Tobacco royal monopoly is a clear 
example (Marichal and Grafenstein 2012), (Irigoin and Grafe 2008). So, if gains were not evenly 
distributed is it fair to assume that the per capita burden was even? Before addressing this 
point a clarification about the role of transfers is due. 
 
The per capita tax take cannot capture the fiscal burden fully if equivalent amounts were 
ploughed back into the district by means of spending. Colonial treasuries rarely performed in 
deficit as expenditures, total and net per capita, always matched revenues. This is a result of 
the very nature of the data, i.e. reports of the state of treasury to the king. It is thus 
anachronistic to interpret the flow of transfers in terms of deficits or surpluses.  Indeed 
treasuries spent what they obtained as revenues –cash flow needs were sourced from local 
lending while waiting for the remittances to clear the debts. This does not mean that 
treasuries did not borrow – as suggested by the absence of interest-bearing loans in the 
accounts; they did it by other means, and heavily as will be seen below.  
 
More importantly these transfers meant a sizable disparity in the burden of the contribution of 
American subjects to the royal purse. As seen in table 3 the River Plate, Buenos Aires and 
Montevideo, could (and did) spend well above their genuine income – and by a substantial 
disproportion of their income. Conversely, in most of Bolivian treasuries revenues were not 
spent locally, i.e. only half or less remained invested in the same district. Treasuries in Peru 
as a whole in the 1780s recorded 50% of extra spending over their genuine means which was 
shouldered by taxpayers elsewhere. Overall, locally raised revenues made up only half of 
what treasuries spent in the region before transfers, so arguably the regional distribution of 
the fiscal burden was indeed very uneven.   
 
Table 3. 
Regional variation of tax burden, per capita revenues and expenditures, and transfers selected 
treasuries c. 1800. 
 Net Rev pc 
@1800 
Net Exp pc 
@ 1800 
Transfer pc 
1796-1800 
annual avg 
 population 
Arequipa           (Peru) 5.39 3.87 -3.34 37,721 
Cuzco                (Peru) 12.15 7.56 -5.17 32,082 
Huamanga         (Peru) 6.80 4.49 -5.03 25,970 
Lima                  (Peru) 5.24 8.87 6.67 201,259 
Trujillo              (Peru) 18.13 12.15 -10.22 17,700 
Guayaquil          (Ecuador) 4.06 3.53 n.a 39,045 
La Paz                (Bolivia) 12.32 3.47 -5.72 40,000 
Potosi                 (Bolivia) 18.29 17.03 4.75 35,000 
Concepcion         (Chile) 5.23 2.76 n.a 105,114 
Chiloe                 (Chile) 4.38 4.50 n.a 26,703 
Mendoza             (Chile) 4.61 1.46 -0.16 8,765 
Santiago              (Chile) 9.26 4.28 n.a 203,732 
Buenos Aires        (River Plate) 16.40 28.44 19.85 72,165 
Montevideo          (River Plate) 40.31 49 7.32 14,093 
Paraguay               (River Plate) 1.03 1.07 0.27 100,000 
Salta                      (River Plate) 4.58 3.98 n.a 13,528 
Santa Fe               (River Plate) 0.07 1.63 -0.11 12,600 
Durango               (Mexico) 2.95 0.24 -2.54 157,970 
Guadalajara          (Mexico) 1.57 0.20 -1.21 623,572 
Guanajuato           (Mexico) 2.36 0.15 -1.74 511,616 
Merida                  (Mexico) 1.06 0.62 n.a 460,620 
Mexico                  (Mexico) 24.41 24.85 -2.81 1,495,140 
Oaxaca                  (Mexico) 0.92 0.09 -0.51 528,860 
Puebla                   (Mexico) 1.36 0.46 -0.09 821,277 
SL Potosi               (Mexico) 2.83 0.16 -2.68 311,503 
Veracruz                (Mexico) 14.35 20.54 2.29 154,286 
Zacatecas               (Mexico) 9.04 4.58 -4.91 151,749 
Notes: Shade corresponds to the respective large colonial administrative unit, ie.Viceroyalties; in brackets the 
corresponding 19
th
 republic. Source: own estimates from (Grafe Irigoin, 2012). 
 
Without uniformity in tax rates and exemptions and without a single centralized fiscal 
authority the tax burden - measured by the per capita amounts transferred and received in 
each district - varied greatly within the same larger region
11
.  In fact regional inequalities 
were embedded in the system. Tribute from indigenous population in Bolivia ranged between 
6 and 13.6 pesos per capita (Klein 1993) table 3.15), so the average of 4.30 pesos for Bolivia 
as a whole masks a substantial dispersion in the burden of colonial taxation. Table 3 also 
shows the redistributive effects of the intra-colonial transfers throughout. It distinguishes 
those who gained: the capital and the ports, from those who paid; in Mexico for instance, the 
big mining towns Durango, Guanajuato, Guadalajara, San Luis Potosi and Zacatecas, or the 
populous indigenous districts of South Peru. The observed negative sign for Mexico City is 
compensated by surpluses received in Veracruz – or Acapulco for which no population data 
are available. From these ports revenues were sent to Cuba, Spain and Manila and worked as 
capital for private trade. 
 
This does not mean, however, that mining revenues were directly extracted.  The collection 
of indirect taxes on trade and consumption fostered by silver dissemination within explains 
the multiplication of treasuries in the interior- connecting mining towns and populated 
consumer centres with coastal trading ports. This structure persisted after independence and 
gave way to a number of internal customs within each new republic – distorting whatever 
benefits were to be obtained from freer trade. Hence post-independence ‘free’ trade 
legislation initially lowered the tariff at the ports, but internal customs still taxed goods 
moving inland. The alcabala, as an overland trade tax levied on domestic or foreign goods in 
transit, persisted well into the 19
th
 century and in Spain it was only abolished in 1845.  
Mexicans living in the capital had to pay an additional 15% ‘introduction’ surtax on 
consumer goods entering the city after 1821 (Sanchez Santiro 2009) so benefits from the 
‘release of the trade burden’ were lost in the poor integration of domestic markets. Thus 
colonial taxation became the institutional legacy which dissipated any gains expected from 
greater openness to the international economy.  
                                                          
11 There was neither a single fiscal jurisdiction nor was there a single constituency in Spain. Taxes were 
particular to individual territories. The treasury relied on tax farming and encabezamientos or 
contributions made by the ayuntamientos – town councils- in proportion to the population. Attempts to 
centralize the collection of taxes started in 1742 in some large Andalusian and Castilian towns without 
success. (Fontana, 1987 p 22-26). 
 3. THE LEGACY 
Economic historians explaining the 1820-1870 slump suggest political-institutional causes: 
instability, warfare, fiscal and financial disorder. For Prados (2009) the ‘costs of self- 
government’ and the ‘costs of administering political units’ of a suboptimal size increased 
transaction costs that offset any benefits from the release of colonial –trade and fiscal- 
burdens. Yet, earlier scholarship had found positive externalities from ‘more liberal’ policies 
followed by Buenos Aires or Cuba for example, which distinguished them as successful 
export economies from the more backward ‘closed’ economies on the mainland. Some 
countries were more effective than others at creating ‘modern’ institutions that better 
protected private property rights (Bordo and Cortes Conde 2001) – away from predatory 
caudillos-  (Amaral 1993); or were more successful at creating more market-friendly 
institutions (Coatsworth 1993). Export growth and access to international capital markets 
mirror institutional success.  
 
Indeed nearly all the states that emerged after 1808 in Spanish America – and in the 
metropolis - dealt with the constitutional crisis with similar institutional designs. In America 
this was the cue for autonomy from neighbouring colonial authorities rather than for 
independence from Spain since de-facto, the metropolis had very little control over their 
resources
12
. However, not all the colonies had enjoyed the benefits of being part of the same 
political compact in the same way as seen in table 3. It is thus not surprising that the Plan de 
Gobierno de la Junta Tuitiva of La Paz (Bolivia) early in 1809 manifested the decision to 
cease sending money to Buenos Aires; while renewing allegiance to the imprisoned king 
(Roca 2007) p 20). Each proclamation in the colonies following these events echoes this issue 
somewhat – even among those which initially remained loyal to the king.  Autonomy from 
colonial authorities rather than independence from Spain was the issue.  Regions with fewer 
treasury districts and more homogenous size, such as Chile or Ecuador, were relatively 
spared from these tensions (Alexander Rodriguez 1992). 
 
Both metropolis and colonies sought an institutional solution in the Cortes of Cadiz. With 
colonial representation the Cortes sanctioned a constitution to be the foundation for a 
                                                          
12 It may be slightly inaccurate to assign to 1808 the drive for independence in the colonies. Conservative 
policies of the restoration governments in 1814 precipitated such reaction which ended up with the 
separation, formally, by 1820 and the ‘liberal’ revolution in Spain.  
provisional government for ‘las Españas’.  The charter conceived representation of ‘both 
hemispheres’ in the Cortes and in the seven-member government to provisionally replace the 
king [art 7, 10]. Population -as one single constituency - was to be represented ‘in proportion’ 
erasing the historical territorial jurisdictions, e.g. one deputy for every 70,000 people 
according to the 1797 census for Spain. There was, however, no counting for population in 
America [art 31]. This threshold left the majority of medium-sized and small towns –i.e. the 
great majority of treasury districts - without representation [art 32-33] and conferred political 
control on large colonial cities. Moreover, citizenship as a political right was granted to all 
males who were ‘not broke or servant, nor unemployed or a felon’; as a means to incorporate 
individual subjects to a single constituency –abrogating privileges i.e. fueros – was equally 
ambiguous.  There were no property restrictions to suffrage and literacy was to become a 
requirement only after 1830 [art 25]. The mita and personal tribute were abolished. To this, 
first constitutional texts in America added the end of the slave trade and the emancipation of 
slaves. Famously the 1821 Plan de Iguala in Mexico recognized all inhabitants, Europeans, 
Africans and indigenous alike as citizens ‘without distinction’ (art 12) and like most early 
charters incorporated the vast majority of male citizens into an inclusive but vaguely defined 
nation-state. Similar liberality regarding political and civil rights appears in early 
constitutional charters such as Venezuela (1811), Antioquia (1812), or Peru (1821) (Perez 
Herrero 2015/2009). 
 
On these bases for representation the Cortes filled in the legitimacy vacuum. The 1812 text 
was mostly concerned with the constitutional role of the king and of the Cortes. The new 
form of government was defined as “moderate monarchy” (art 14) and representation of the 
constituents was consistent with Spanish tradition (Guerra 1994). Direct election was the 
means to appoint new legitimate authorities. Political historians have convincingly shown 
that elections were a widespread practice of the late 18
th
 century political culture (Benson 
1946; Posada-Carbó 1996). Thus with the 1808 crisis, now contested elections repeated in vice 
regal capitals as well as in pueblos de indios or small towns across of Spanish America 
(Warren 1996; Caplan 2003), (Echeverri 2015; Ternavasio 2015 ), and (Sartorious 2015) for Cuba’s 
exceptional case) and the 1812 charter organized the template for popular sovereignty and the 
recognition of equal political rights for all citizens (Eastman and Sobrevilla Perea 2015). The 
Buenos Aires constitution of 1821 granted universal male suffrage – which was replicated 
later in other provinces (Annino 1995).  In some places participation was initially high – e.g. 
Santiago, Bogota, Buenos Aires - but turnout steadily reduced over time
13
. Between 1812 and 
1854 Mexico only sanctioned 35 electoral laws and statutes that reformed the mechanism of 
elections, making procedures more arbitrary and placing ever more stringent restrictions – 
e.g. wealth, property, age, literacy- to franchise (Garcia Orozco 1978). This makes it clear that 
the exclusionary character of Latin American politics is not a direct legacy of colonialism; 
but rather an outcome of 19
th
 century politics.  Nonetheless elections were held at irregular 
intervals; they systematically occurred just after a revolution to invest legality to the new 
order, thus developing more a perfunctory role of ex-post legitimization (Fowler 2010), 
(Halperin Donghi 1979).  Thus the nature of the Spanish monarchy, formerly based on 
privileges and hierarchies of corporate subjects and historical territories arbitrated by the 
king, was altered for an ill-defined popular sovereignty in a territorial compact whose 
constituents were now individuals all equal before the treasury. Yet the fiscal basis to sustain 
such a state remained de-facto unchanged. Ambiguities regarding territorial and individual 
representation in fiscal matters are one major institutional legacy of the Spanish Ancien 
Regime and colonialism. 
 
The chapter on taxation is very short; only 17 of a total of 371 articles, and is particularly 
ambiguous about sources of revenues and prerogatives of the state to collect taxes. Cortes to 
be elected was to establish or ‘confirm taxes, direct or indirect, provincial or municipal’ in 
the future. In practice the charter allowed for the continuation of existing taxes ‘until new 
levies were established’. Consistent with the liberal rhetoric taxes were to be borne by all 
Spaniards in ‘proportion of their facultades’ and the king’s prerogative to grant privileges and 
exemptions to individuals and corporate bodies was abrogated. This aimed to establish a 
uniform – and wider- fiscal base but said nothing about particular fiscal regimes in the 
peninsula such as the Basque country or Navarra, nor made any special reference to the 
transfers between (or out of) the colonies. Article 11 listed the territories comprising ‘Spain 
in America, Asia and Europe’ and postponed ‘the division of this territory by a constitutional 
law for a convenient time political circumstances permitting’. Notably, article 340 established 
that ‘taxes were to be proportional to expenditures’ disregarding the identity principle that 
treasuries need to collect in order to spend
14
.  Territories were to be subject to an unspecified 
                                                          
13 Turnout in 1820s Bogota was around 15% {Deas, 1996 #1335; Deas, 1996 #1335}The 1824 Mexican 
Constitution established biannual elections for Congress. However, between 1821 and 1855 there were 
22 elections. {Aguilar Rivera, 2010 #1328} p 13. 
14 Official budgets in 1840s Spain still conceived nearly a 50% deficit without any provision to meet the 
gap (Tedde, 1994 p 32-33). 
direct contribution ‘contribución directa’ to be apportioned among the provinces ‘according 
to their wealth’ without any indication of its source or a mechanism to assess it.   
 
Aiming for greater centralization, one general treasury was to be created at the head of a set 
of similar single treasuries in each of the unspecified provinces; however, collection 
remained in the hands of the towns, i.e. ayuntamientos and cabildos [art 321-323]. Revenues 
should thereafter be sent to the main treasury districts where authorities decided about 
spending. This additional lack of identity between the agents who spent and those who 
collected revenues was to be crucial thereafter.  Article 354 abolished all customs ‘other than 
maritime and at the borders’, but the borders were not defined [art 11]; so in America internal 
customs appeared between former treasury districts -now autonomous- and the fiscal 
autonomy of historical territories in the metropolis persisted.  The charter admitted that the 
public debt was ‘a matter of the first order importance’ (particularly after the failed 
consolidation of the vales reales) however it did not earmark revenues for a sinking fund - or 
make any effective decision on the debt that mattered.  Notably, as per article 131, the Cortes 
was to determine the value, weight, and fineness of the silver and denomination of the coins, 
without a mint or a bank with which to implement it.  A final very short chapter on education 
with 6 articles [366-371] promised free access to primary schools and even allowed for the 
creation of universities but with no indication of the means with which to do so.  
 
Two major constitutional issues were not resolved: the representation and the aggregation of 
territories and subjects constituents of this state and the means to fund it accordingly. This 
double ambiguity meant an unsurmountable limitation to the fiscal sovereignty of the state 
which only exacerbated the ongoing institutional crisis. The existing economic and fiscal 
disparities among districts made it even less feasible to incorporate them into new sovereign 
polities. The deep local roots of the structure of taxation from pervasive tax farming, sale of 
office and privileges were a formidable obstacle to any subsequent negotiation regarding the 
territorial integration of treasuries.  With local autonomy – and without a clear sovereign - the 
fiscal compact disintegrated. Lacking legitimacy, public property rights to taxation 
disappeared and without transfers from other districts’ governments income everywhere 
reduced sharply. Legitimacy to rule and to tax was put into question and any successive 
political aggregation at a broader regional scale such as the Gran Colombia, the Central 
America Confederation and the Provincias Unidas del Rio de la Plata, quickly failed.   
 
These were the costs of independence. Focusing on the disintegration of the empire, however, 
has overshadowed the fact that the political and fiscal history of the metropolis is very 
comparable; there too the process of political ‘aggregation’ and fiscal constitution of a 
popular sovereignty proved as haphazard.  The failure of every political compromise led to 
war over resources and revenues while military spending fuelled public deficits and mounting 
debts. But war and disorder have not been an impediment for the making of strong states - 
and successful economic development- as the literature on the fiscal military states in modern 
Europe attests. Unable to pay for allegiance or recruits, revolutionary governments in 
America offered very generous entitlements to large sectors of the population. Tax 
exemptions, tariff reductions, and entitlements, i.e. a wide definition of citizenry to all 
Americans, elimination of tribute, emancipation of slaves, direct elections to appoint army 
officials, etc did not always provide an immediate yield to the treasury but helped to mobilize 
support without money. They also created a significant if confusing set of rights – civil, 
social and political- available to all individuals in their own transition from subjects of the      
 
3.1. Representation without taxation 
Seeking to broaden the fiscal base of the republican state, governments in the 1820s tried to 
move away from indirect trade and consumption taxes to more direct contributions - echoing 
the rhetoric about representation of the 1812 charter. Probably the most dramatic reform 
program was that of General Sucre in Bolivia, which abolished the mita, the tobacco 
monopoly and the alcabala together with the indigenous tribute. Instead, it devised a direct, 
universal levy on every Bolivian – the nondescript contribución directa- which was rejected 
by all parties affected and abolished within three years.
15
  Under Spanish rule indigenous 
people paid tribute but had been exempted from the alcabala; the rest, white, free blacks and 
mestizos alike paid this sales tax but did not pay any head taxes. In Mexico, the 1821 Federal 
Constitution abolished the tribute and granted the levy of direct taxes to state (provincial) 
governments; however regional elites rejected the new taxation and by the 1830s most states 
had further increased indirect contributions like alcabalas and monopolies. A few populous 
states like Oaxaca and Yucatan continued the indigenous capitation and the tithe from which 
they obtained the bulk of their income well into the 1840s  (Serrano Ortega 2007). Tribute was 
also abolished in Ecuador in 1823 - to be re-established within three or four years – and in 
Peru by the 1821 reforms together with the alcabala. Yet tribute did not cease completely 
                                                          
15 It consisted of a vaguely defined personal or head tax, partly a property tax and partly an income tax. 
Indigenous villages rejected them to keep ownership of communal lands{Sanchez Albornoz, 1978 #265} . 
until 1895 (Contreras 2006). This contrast between Mexico and Peru is explained by the 
greater commercial orientation of the Mexican indigenous economy. The relatively greater 
dispersion of silver mining in Mexico may also explain the choice for the persistence of the 
alcabala until the 1857 constitution (on paper) and beyond, until 1896, in practice
16
. In any 
case this feature, which troubled the integration of the domestic economy, mirrors the 
different degree of centralization that Peru enjoyed over Mexico - and the respective path in 
their constitutional designs
17
.  
 
The fiscal reforms of the 1820s in Latin America - including those of Rivadavia in Buenos 
Aires, San Martin in Peru (Anna 1974), Santander in Colombia  (Bushnell 1953/1970) and 
Sucre in Bolivia (Lofstrom 1970) - failed on three main counts: to establish direct taxation, to 
increase revenue collection and to build fiscal capacity. The same happened with the 1813 
reform in Spain. Paradoxically the failure reinforced central governments’ dependence on 
customs and monopolies even further (Centeno 2002).  Tariffs in the hands of central 
governments continuously increased throughout. Taxes mainly levied on imports made up at 
least half of revenues as in Mexico and 80% of revenues in most other countries. With the 
continuation of the colonial alcabala the fiscal burden fell squarely on consumers. A few 
countries, such as Peru, obtained similar income from taxes on guano exports after 1850 or 
Chile, later, with a similar near monopolistic position in the production of nitrates. For most 
of the period in Chile and Mexico the colonial tobacco monopoly still constituted 60% or 
more of total revenues (Tenenbaum 1986). Together with the salt monopoly it represented 
60% of revenues in Colombia until the 1850s. Elsewhere land sales, either public as in the 
River Plate or expropriated from the church as in Bolivia or from indigenous villages as in 
Colombia (Halperin 1979), (Abendroth 1990; Kalmanovitz 2006) occasionally rendered 
additional revenues.  
 
Yet the per capita tax take of republican governments was lower than what the colonial 
treasury had extracted. Assembling information from a patchwork of sources for population 
and revenues, table 4 shows the estimated fiscal burden for comparable districts in years for 
which data are available. Caution is in order as the robustness of the indicators is debatable so 
                                                          
16 {Jauregui, 2010 #1449}   
17 Republican governments in both cases replaced the mining tithe – which was collected by the church- 
with a 3% tax {Contreras, 1999 #162}. 
real values are no more than a makeshift
18
. These are all nominal values but price data are 
even more paltry; possibly the best available estimate of 19
th
 century living standards is that 
of Peru (Gootenberg 1990) which basically considers prices in Lima only. Yet comparing with 
estimates displayed in table 2 the government’s tax take had reduced dramatically in the 
Mexican Federation, Chile, Peru and Bolivia, and this situation is repeated when comparing 
the colonial fiscal burden at district level shown in table 3 above. Veracruz’s dramatic fall 
mirrors the end of the intra-colonial transfers; other Mexican states’ governments had lost 
half or more of their nominal value in 1800 in spite of the fact that population remained 
stable or migrated to larger cities.  
 
Table 4 
Estimated per capita fiscal burden, Spanish America 1820-1850. 
  Gross 
revenue 
pop  Per capita 
revenue 
Real pc 
revenue 
Chile  1800    5.11*  
 1835 2003421 1010332  1.98  
 1843 3063568 1038801  2.94  
Mexico   1800    9.15* ** 
 1825 8567954 6500000  1.31 11.64 
 1827 15173469 8000000  1.89 1.51 
 1830 17776870 7996000  2.22 2.36 
 1831 16040591 6382284  2.51 2.22 
 1834 17737883 7734292  2.29 3.48 
 1842 18865148 7015509  2.68 2.7 
 1844 22194712 7000000  3.17 3.63 
 1841-44 19262682 7015509  2.74 4.46 
Buenos 
Aires prov. 
1800 2782669
a
 72615   38.55* 38.55 
 1819 2408242
b 
125000  19.26 19.26 
 1829 7915579 153000  51.73 13.90 
                                                          
18 Unlike colonial data used in table 3, table 4 data state gross revenue indiscriminately and include 
carryovers and financial income of all sorts. Systematic counting of the population –itself a measure of 
state capacity- started only in the second half of the century in most republics.  
Bolivia 1800    4.33*  
 1827 1867041 1100000  1.69  
 1846 2363034 1378896  1.71  
Peru  1800    2.28* 1.73 
 1826 3346032 1500000  2.23 1.98 
 1830 3003489 1249723  2.40 2.40 
 1831 3526148 1373736  2.56 2.65 
 1846 5515591 1373736  4.01 4.93 
 1850 7029112 2001123  3.51 4.28 
Mexican 
states 
    
Durango 1800    2.95* 
  1825-26 312479 120157  2.60  
 1833 391091 139081  2.81  
Mexico  1826-27 892130 829458  1.07  
 1833-34 728270 1039758  0.70  
Guanajuato 1800    2.36* 
  1829 733444 442916  1.65  
 1831 654853 494823  1.32  
Jalisco/ 
Guadalajara 
1800     1.57* 
  1830 614858 656881  0.93  
 1831 505443 660595  0.76  
 1834 532600 680000  0.78  
Puebla 1800    1.36* 
  1825 405618 584358  0.69  
S.Luis 
Potosi 
1800     2.83* 
  1828 470050 297593  1.57  
 1830 448500 310196  1.44  
Veracruz 1830 241659 242658  0.99  
Zacatecas 1800     9.04* 
 
 1825 620018 247295  2.50  
 1826 689032 272901  2.52  
 1830 844049 274537  3.07  
 1832 1476757 314121  4.70  
Notes: * data from annual average ‘net per capita revenues’ 1796-1800 Ibid table 2; ** Mexico adjusted by 
annual CPI value in silver grains index from (Challu and Gomez Galvarriato 2015), *** Peru: adjusted by 
annual inflation index from (Gootenberg, 1990 table 3); a) Annual average net per capita revenue for Buenos 
Aires only, b) data for 1822 (Burgin, table 7)* M. Burgin, The Economic Aspects of Argentine Federalism, 
1820-1850 (Cambridge, 1947) p 53. 
 
Back in 1989 Jacobsen estimated that per capita collection of revenues in Peru had fallen 
from “28.9 reals in the mid-1790s to 23.3 reals in 1850”. This reduction of almost 20% in the 
nominal value of the collection represented about 43% in real terms as he assumed “a 30% 
inflation rate for the period 1800s and 1850s” (Jacobsen 1989)p 315). More recent data show 
successive cycles of deflation and inflation as the result of lower levels of silver in circulation 
and inflationary financing of wars before the guano boom (Gootenberg 1990, 28-30). This 
explains the relatively higher tax burden of the 1840s. Otherwise, as in Mexico, the tax take 
of the republican government was a fraction of the colonial burden in spite of moderate price 
inflation (Challu Gomez Galvarriato, 2015).   
 
In Spain, the 1843-45 Mon Santillan reforms – together with a new constitution- abolished 
internal customs with the discontinuation of alcabalas; widespread exemptions and tax 
farming in on behalf of the church and wealthy individuals notwithstanding they granted a 
slightly greater fiscal control to the central government (Serrano 2015/2009). Yet in the 1850s 
the bulk of revenues still originated from customs, monopolies and other consumption taxes 
(Yun Casalilla, O'Brien et al. 2012). A new direct tax known as the ‘contribución territorial’ did 
not yield; this ill-defined levy on land property (not on income or capital) left the valuation 
and collection of taxes in the hands of ayuntamientos. Various disentailments of royal and 
church real estate (1811, 1836-37, 1841, 1855) to pay old debts or paid with depreciated scrip 
provided some occasional income but, as in Spanish America, large sales of lands distorted 
land markets and fostered the concentration of assets.  
 
Everywhere ‘Liberals and Absolutist’ (or conservative) governments alike faced the same 
fiscal problems and resolved them in very much the same fashion: repeated insolvency, 
further indebtedness and further indirect taxes
19
. This was not a matter of politics or 
ideologies. In Buenos Aires for instance the same individual, Manuel Garcia, was responsible 
for finances for fifteen years and served under diametrically different governments –in the 
eyes of political historians - those of Rivadavia and Rosas (Irigoin 2000). Frequent changes of 
governments in both former colonies and metropolis are a symptom of protracted instability 
but comparable changes at the head of the treasury intimate that this was far from a legacy of 
colonialism. Between 1827 and 1855 Mexico had 49 different governments and 119 ministers 
of finance, who lasted an average of 4 months in office if the government was 
constitutionally appointed, or barely 3 weeks in the de facto regimes. In the metropolis, 
between the French withdrawal in 1814 and the 1868 revolution, there were 54 cabinets and 
92 different ministers of finance
20
.  
 
Indeed both Spanish and Spanish American governments became insolvent in the wake of the 
crisis following the Napoleonic occupation of Spain and their commercial and fiscal deficits 
continued with force (Comin 1988). Both colonies and metropolis amassed huge domestic 
debts and borrowed heavily in European capital markets; cash-strapped Spanish American 
republics found ready money in London in the 1820s and applied fresh funds to make their 
reforms viable. Within a few years they had all defaulted and remained sealed off from 
further foreign borrowing for the next forty years (Marichal 1989). Only when governments 
restored some soundness to their treasuries were they to become credible borrowers in 
London again.  Spanish governments did slightly better; they repeatedly defaulted or 
repudiated the domestic debt (1836, 1840) (Tedde de Lorca and Marichal 1994) p 64). Spain 
was also able to borrow in London in the 1820s and in France in the early 1830s; adding this 
debt to the arrears from the Dutch loans of the 1800s (Canga Arguelles 1833)- but lost direct 
access to foreign finance in the late 1830s (Platt 1983) p124). Thereafter the government 
could only survive with short run lending from the house of Rothschild – but at a significant 
fiscal cost: the loss of revenues from one of the world’s most important quicksilver 
deposits
21
.  
 
                                                          
19 In Spain the government unilaterally restructured the debt as in 1818, repudiated it (partly) in 1828, 
defaulted or nearly defaulted in 1836 and 1847. 
20 Numbers count the ministers, some individual names repeated in the post.  For Mexico {Stevens, 1991 
#134} for Spain: (Urquijo Goitia, 2015) . 
21 In 1835 the Almaden mines were leased to Rothschild.  Mercury was a critical input for the refining of 
silver and the house controlled the refining of precious metals in Paris and London which made it 
dominant in the exchange business in Europe.{Lopez Morell, 2013 #1357} , p83 fig.12.10).    
3.2. TAXATION WITHOUT CONSENT 
In the 1820s most of the republics also consolidated their debt –including arrears from old 
colonial claims. In Mexico by 1816 it represented 120% of the total revenues of the Mexican 
treasury in the bountiful years of 1800s; the proportion was 300% for Lima in 1821 and 
150% in Buenos Aires
22
. The three treasuries had been major recipients of transfers before 
1810 so without these extra revenues the debt burden was several times larger in the 1820s 
(Grafe Irigoin 2012 p 629). As part of the reforms some republican governments launched 
their first public debt issues. Early on Buenos Aires chartered a private bank of issue and 
established a stock exchange as a marketplace for public funds and foreign exchange. The 
funded debt in 1821 amounted to twice as much as the yearly treasury revenue at the time. By 
1840 it had multiplied tenfold as it helped to fund the customs shortfall from European 
blockades to the port. Unsurprisingly bonds as a financial resource vanished; a twentyfold 
increase in the volume of the fiduciary currency issued by the bank and a subsequent 
depreciation of the exchange rate with gold which fell from 17 to 370 pesos in the same 
period annihilated the domestic market for government debt (Irigoin 2000).   
 
By 1821 Spain’s domestic debt – which included the principal and arrears of the failed Vales 
Reales- represented about the same amount as annual revenues (Tedde 1999, 12, Prados 
1993, Table 10). The metropolis had lost the fiscal returns from re-exports of other European 
goods to the colonies and revenues from trade services had collapsed. Spain was still able to 
borrow abroad for a while. After 1834 short term bills – mainly from France - multiplied the 
nominal volume of external debt. It was already 20 times larger than in 1821 and it grew 
another 50% in the subsequent fifteen years (Sardá Dexeus 1948) p 60, 90). Established in 
1829 on the remains of the failed Banco de San Carlos, the Banco de San Fernando -with 
limited large operations confined to Madrid- issued notes to lend to the government without 
building equivalent metallic reserves. (Tedde, 1994, 30, Sarda, 1948, 32). The bank assisted 
the government during the Carlista war and it helped further with an extraordinary issue of 
notes without reserves – as fiduciary money in 1844-47 (Tedde 1994 table 1.4, Sarda, 1948, 
94). It merged with the Banco de Isabel II in 1847 which multiplied its issues even more. 
Funding the government debt represented 60-70% of the bank’s assets and crippled the 
peculiar banking system of the country as Tedde has painstakingly described. Unsurprisingly, 
                                                          
22 The amount of the certified debt was 21.6 million pesos in Mexico, 21.7 million in Peru and 4 million in 
Buenos Aires (Grafe Irigoin, 2012). Using Coatsworth’s 1998 GDP data these figures represent 10% of 
Mexican GDP, 50% of Peru’s GDP and 16% of Argentina’s GDP. The figure for Spain was 13,120 million 
reals but 60% of it was repudiated by the government in 1828 (Tedde, 1994 p12). 
lending to private business was minimal. Yet the financial reform and creation of the Banco 
de España in the 1850s did not end the recourse to finance debt by monetary means; it would 
turn into open inflationary finance policy later in 1883 with the inconvertibility of the peseta 
(Martin Acena 1981 ). 
 
Thus, recurrent deficits were increasingly financed with debt (which was often re-structured) 
or money creation when both foreign and domestic lenders had been exhausted. In some 
countries the last resort eventually was money creation by means of rigging the banks as was 
the case in 1840s Spain, debasing the currency as in 1830s Mexico or 1850s Bolivia, or just 
printing fiat money as in Buenos Aires in 1826 (Mitre 1986); (Tedde 1999; Irigoin 2000; 
Centeno 2002), (Torres Medina 1998).This also triggered a remarkable change in monetary 
policy with lasting impact; the expansion of  currency to meet fiscal disequilibrium opened an 
early door to governments to use money as a fiscal instrument. Depreciated exchange rates 
hence also provided additional protection and stimulated the production of some exports – 
especially when international prices were falling - despite scholars’ insistence on the 
importance of tariffs throughout the 19th century (Coatsworth and Williamson 2004). Effects of 
the monetization of the deficit further disintegrated money markets and exacerbated regional 
and political tensions within a formerly integrated monetary union. 
 
According to Spanish monetary historians a ‘contradictory’ monetary policy, particularly 
after 1823, failed to attract specie to the mint (Sarda, 1948), imposing substantial deflationary 
effects on the Spanish economy ((Sardá Dexeus 1947), (Nogues-Marco 2005) for a 
qualification). Throughout, a systematic – but unexplained- overvaluation of silver drove 
specie out of circulation; e.g. the gold/silver exchange rate was 1:15.2 in the UK, 15.5 in 
France and 16.5 and even 16.7 in Spain, so ‘Spanish coins were hence hoarded or exported en 
masse’. Thus insufficient circulating medium sustained demand for lesser quality French 
coins for decades. Liberal governments hoped to revert this early in the 1820s without 
success. The 1824 Restoration’s monetary policy was notoriously prejudicial and the flight 
‘of pesos duros or fuertes’ continued despite large foreign loans. Deflation was significant 
until 1830 and continued through the 1840s (Carreras 2005)(Table 16.9 p 1288-90) despite the 
reopening of the Barcelona mint and renewed coinage in Madrid (Sarda, 1948 80-88).  Other 
foreign coins, Mexican and Portuguese, even entered circulation increasing the disorder. 
Without means governments were unlikely to run a mint or any foreign exchange policy 
effectively, so low coinage it is no wonder. 
 
Yet it is unclear which Spanish silver coins were dominant in circulation; according to Sarda 
(p 67) these were pesos ‘fuertes or duros’ with higher intrinsic silver value than French coins, 
and were most likely good Spanish American pesos.  As in Peru, and elsewhere, from the 
mid-1820s to the mid-1830s good silver coins were siphoned off given their appreciation in 
France, Britain and even more so in the traditional Asian markets. Deflation was a common 
trait in these economies (Gootenberg 1990). In some silver rich countries several mints 
appeared and cut coins of various qualities – some of which reasonably should have ended up 
in Spain (Irigoin 2009 ). In circulation along with the francesas, Gresham effects occurred and 
arguably resulted in deflationary consequences as described by Sarda. Notably the exchange 
rate of sterling and the French franc remained relatively stable throughout the period 1821-
1855 – with exceptional blips in 1847 (Tedde 1999 table V-2 and XI-3), (Prados de la Escosura 
1986) app 7. Given the state of the banking system, the markets for money and exchange 
were highly fragmented adding further transaction costs to the already weak integration of the 
Spanish domestic economy (Nogues-Marco 2015).   
 
Research on the macroeconomic situation of Spain in this period is still a work in progress 
but evidence from very detailed narratives presents the problems of Spain as being very 
similar in nature to those of her former colonies. Whereas in some parts of Spanish America 
inflation was an optimal solution to debt finances in times of war (Bordo and Vegh 2002), it 
continued being a source in peaceful times and for economies with very different 
endowments and institutions – such as Bolivia or Buenos Aires as late as the 1850s (Irigoin, 
2009). The lack of consensus about the form of the state, about the sources of revenues and 
the liable subjects, and the disassociation between tax collectors and bearers, all contributed 
to a very low collection rate, a shallow fiscal base and ultimately to insufficient revenues. In a 
political regime in which representation bore no relation with taxation, governments became 
insolvent, lacking fiscal capacity or legitimacy (often both), taxation ought to happen without 
consent.  
 
4. ANOTHER LEGACY 
Institutionalist interpretations of Latin American long run development customarily assess 
her performance against that of the United States. However, the political and fiscal 
trajectories of the former colonies of Spain and Britain after independence were hardly 
comparable. As historian Max Edling (Edling 2003) rightly explains, the revolution in the 
British colonies was ‘in the favour of government’, not ‘against the government’ as was 
precisely the case in the Spanish colonies. This difference makes the comparison of their 
respective institutional paths quite problematic. Moreover, considering that both Spain and 
her former colonies were in similar predicaments after independence it is difficult to identify 
it as a prejudice from the colonial legacy. Under British rule North American colonies were 
also separate fiscal and political units, but they were financed by a metropolis which took on 
their defence and minimal government expenses. Unlike the Spanish settlements, where the 
church provided most public goods with substantial funding from the royal purse, the British 
colonies funded public goods such as education with direct taxes raised locally. When the 
French Indian War in the 1750s and 1760s demanded further revenues – and to the colonies 
to bear part of the fiscal costs - Parliament met fierce resistance to further (indirect) 
consumption taxes required from the colonists
23
. This asymmetry between taxation and the 
representation of the colonies in parliament triggered the American Revolution and tax 
resistance continued until the 1790s.  
 
The British levied direct taxes on colonial property and faculty as early as 1660
24
; however 
no comparable taxes were charged in the metropolis where direct taxes increased only after 
1792. In parliamentary England sources of direct taxation –mainly land -had been in relative 
decline since the 1690s. For most of the 18
th
 century customs and excise constituted the bulk 
of her revenues (Ashworth 2003). Apparently the fiscal burden was low in the British colonies 
– and certainly much lower than in the metropolis. However, as Zolt shows ‘representation 
came at a cost’ to independent US: from 1792 to 1811 the per capita tax take increased 10 
times from what the empire had charged in 1765-1775. (Zolt, 2009, 455). Direct taxes 
collected by local government did not cease with the revolution and their income represented 
a substantial part of the revenues available to the new state governments. By 1825 the total 
                                                          
23 The Townshend Act followed the (repealed) Stamp Act, the Sugar Act and others and sought to raise 
revenue in the colonies for self-maintenance. It culminated with the Tea Act of 1773 and protests in 
Boston.   
24 Faculty taxes were levied on the faculty or earning capacity of persons following certain trades or 
having certain skills.  G. Fisher, History of Property Taxes in the US. http://Eh.net/encyclopedia/history –
of-property-taxes-in-the-united-states accessed on 3rd January 2015.  
tax take of the US government was $ 4.33 per person of which 54% corresponded to income 
appropriated by the state and local governments (Zolt, 2009 table 1).  It jumped to $ 8.86 in 
1855, which meant more than double the 1825 value in real terms
25
. This burden was 
certainly much higher than the per capita contribution borne by Spanish Americans as seen in 
table 4
26
.  
 
This growth includes the extraordinary fiscal expansion of the Federalist period. Only in 
1787-89 the Philadelphia Convention incorporated the former colonies into a federal United 
States transforming the equal representation of states in the Continental Congress for the 
proportional representation of citizens in the House of Representatives.  This political 
experiment, the Confederation in which Congress took the governing role from the king, had 
collapsed under the compound of insolvency and currency inflation in 1782-88
27
 (Edling 
2014). As part of the Federalist fiscal program the federal government assumed the debt of 
the individual states and paid them at par with new federal public bonds; this significantly 
relieved the state governments of the cost of the transition to a new political order. In 1790, 
seventy four million dollars’ worth of domestic and foreign debt – about 30% of GNP28 - 
were consolidated in long term interest-bearing bonds which the federal government serviced 
regularly with revenues from trade taxes. Having been part of the fiscal burden levied by the 
British, the US government appropriated what had formerly belonged to the empire. The 
tariff was a prerogative the states surrendered to the federal government by the Impost Acts 
of 1790. Together with some low excise taxes on alcohol, tobacco and sugar, the tariff 
thereafter constituted 70-80% of federal income in the period. Customs revenues amounted to 
$ 4.6 million in 1792 (about 2% of GNP) or $1.36 per capita; in nominal terms they doubled 
by 1800, tripled by 1805 and then quadrupled by 1820. By 1850, the tariff at $ 39 million – or 
$1.98 per capita - still represented 82% of federal revenues (Finances 1870).  
 
What sets the Federalist and Republican programs apart from the Latin American fiscal 
reforms - and from the previous disastrous experience of the Confederation- is the 
                                                          
25 According to the US dollar purchasing power www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/reativevalue.php 
accessed Feb 6th 2015. The annualised inflation rate in the period was -0.45%. 
26 The US dollar and the Spanish American silver peso remained legal tender at par until 1856. 
27 The Constitutional Convention alienated the rights to coin or print money from the state and gave the 
federal government the power to coin in 1792. It also changed the representation of the individual states 
in Congress for the proportional representation of their population. 
28 Of the $74million, $12 to $22 million corresponded to the state’s debt. GNP and debt data from {Bordo, 
2002 #1362} .   
extraordinary capacity the federal state had to service the interest and principal of its debt 
(Wallis 2000). This capacity to tax was not available to governments in Spanish America – nor 
in Spain- not because of the type of levies, but because governments there could not establish 
a taxation system that worked. North Americans eventually agreed to shoulder heavier taxes 
than under British rule (Edling, 2003, 156). The per capita burden calculated by the tax take 
of the three levels of government combined had doubled in 1855 from the per capita 
contribution of 1820, meanwhile population had tripled. (Zolt, 2009 p 458). So even if the 
US, like Latin American republics, relied on customs to service the debt, the argument about 
the colonial fiscal burden in the case of Spanish America needs some closer scrutiny to 
substantiate it.  
 
Prados (2009) explains the extremely different success of the financial origin of republics in 
the Americas by the recurrence of deficits. Already weak Latin American governments were 
further prejudiced by vicious circles of insolvency, debt and inflation. Indeed the problem 
was the impossibility to raise debt because they were no credible payers
29
. By looking solely 
at the federal level, however, scholars tend not to see the real size of the fiscal burden borne 
by the US taxpayer. Considering that the federal burden was half or less than the three levels 
of government take, it means that there was a significant amount of money still appropriated 
by local and state treasuries. This income originated in direct taxes and, more importantly, it 
was spent on education and infrastructure; something which no fiscal district in Spanish 
America was remotely able to dream of as the overwhelming share of expenses went on war 
(Centeno 2002). 
Spanish American (aspiring) governments in capital cities were charging indirect trade taxes 
on taxpayers elsewhere; the latter had no vote or say in the spending of these revenues, nor 
were there channels for redistribution as the transfers that had formerly allowed the co-
optation of regional elites - even if for marginally productive ventures. Indirect taxation 
without representation was the means that republican governments had to establish their 
authority at the centre, and at the top, of the polity in Spanish America. For taxpayers the 
burden was greater if a government elsewhere controlled the custom house at the port or the 
tobacco monopoly – as in landlocked capitals such as Bogota, Mexico and Santiago de Chile. 
Relief from the colonial tax burden was non-existent for the population overall – if it existed 
                                                          
29 The Empire of Brazil adds an interesting twist to institutional explanations about the role of limited 
government and political institutions in providing secure property rights and hence growth {Summerhill, 
2015 #1371} . 
it was appropriated by elites in the capital cities who increasingly restricted political 
representation of territories and individuals. Unsurprisingly fiscal federalism failed. Whereas 
in the federal US some states even invested in banks, turnpike and canal construction through 
private-public partnerships and taxed profits from banks and insurance companies and capital 
gains on these stocks (Sylla 1999) 266.  Thus some states managed to fund up to 60% of their 
expenses and participated of the greater fiscal capacity of the federal state which relieved 
them from the old debts. The federal government also shared revenues from land sales and 
taxes on businesses. Furthermore, in New England these revenues were sufficient to enable 
some reduction or elimination of state property taxes early on.   
 
Scholars have shown the importance of state revenues for the provision of public education in 
the US (Go and Lindert 2007); by 1820 the Common School achieved the best literacy rate in 
the world thanks to income from direct taxes invested in education serving a broad 
population. There were significant regional variations between states however. Zolt argues 
that this explains the different type of taxes chosen to support public education spending, and 
hence inequality levels within the US (Zolt, 2009(Lindert 2004)). Elsewhere Sokoloff and Zolt 
have related this to the contemporary extension of the franchise in the US (Sokoloff and Zolt 
2006) 179). They thus explain the different growth performance in South and North America 
in the provision of education resultant from the legacy of inequality that taxation imposed in 
each part of the continent. The channel, they argue, was suffrage institutions. Thus, allegedly, 
North Americans had a less restricted franchise, greater turnout at the ballots and a vigorous 
primary education funded by direct taxation.  Latin Americans, on the other hand, had 
increasingly more restricted franchise, lower turnout and did not – and could not- invest in 
education to account for (Curvale and Przeworski 2008). However, it was not until the Fifteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution in 1870 that all male US citizens were granted the right to 
vote, and most blacks were still disenfranchised, banned or discriminated at the ballot box 
until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 made suffrage universal. Ironically, until 1964 five 
southern states used the payment of poll tax as a requirement to vote, which was repealed by 
the Twenty Fourth Amendment – yet eight states have not ratified it to date.  
 
Notwithstanding, Spanish Americans were not originally precluded from voting and had 
significant means for investing in education at their disposal given their rate of control over 
colonial treasuries. Furthermore every early constitutional text included a chapter on public 
education as a right to the people and a responsibility of the state. However asymmetries 
between agents deciding collection and spending of revenues from mainly indirect taxes 
rendered paltry yields to the treasury. Direct taxation in the US also proved an advantage for 
more equal, better educated societies (in some states) because as Zolt points out, ‘where the 
median voter has less income than the mean, the median voter will favour income tax regimes 
under which her share of taxes will be less than their share of government benefit supported 
by the tax revenue’ (2009, 449). This theorem may not work if the median voter pays indirect 
taxes for which, moreover, rates are decided elsewhere and revenues are disinvested from 
public goods to service debt or eroded by inflation.  This was the situation in republican 
Spanish America, where a substantial provision of public goods was taken care of by private 
sources like the church and charities and so not perceived as return for taxation. Similarly a 
number of private goods were provided by public sources which were part and parcel of the 
‘developmentalism’ of the colonial state; thus employment, food security and a host of 
subsidies to private activities were then understood as entitlements
30
. In this case the median 
voter would dissociate the identity between revenue and expenditure and may unreasonably 
prefer lower taxation to fund lower expenditure given that no real redistributive effects were 
to be expected.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Weakened governments could not tax, without income they could not last and they even had 
to spend more and more to remain in power. Political instability was rooted in the fiscal 
fragility of the state and every new constitution faltered as fast as the previous one. 
Paradoxically in Spanish America, instead of relieving the burden of colonial taxation, 
independence further weakened the capacities –fiscal, legal and administrative- of the 
republican state and undermined the political institutions that it organized.  Over time – 
because of inelastic expenses from political turmoil on top of growing demands on future 
income from debt and prejudices from monetary disorder - all compounded in chronic fiscal 
deficits and broken governments. Fiscal bases were shallow and shrinking as countries lost 
import or consumption capacity as a result of exchange rate problems and disintegrating 
domestic markets. Further borrowing at shorter terms and higher interest rates led 
governments such as that of Mexico to real bankruptcy within 30 years (Tenembaun 1996, 
Irigoin, 2009). Other governments with even lower fiscal capacity inflated their debts by 
                                                          
30 The ‘developmentalist’ state in Spanish America is explained in (Grafe Irigoin, 2012). It differs 
substantially from the developmental state conceived by{Robinson, 2015 #1373}.   
monetary expansion such as that of Bolivia, or suffered from the impossibility to execute any 
monetary policy, such as Spain or Peru until the 1850s. The lack of consensus regarding the 
form of the state, its fiscal basis and the disassociation between tax collectors and bearers 
ultimately undermined the capacities of the (any) state. The incidence of regressive taxation 
on producers (exporters) and consumers originated large redistribution effects which further 
aggravated centrifugal tensions.   
 
Without fiscal capacity neither debt service nor tax smoothing was possible for Latin 
American governments. Lack of fiscal capacity and regressive taxation had persistent 
implications in the making of the republican state. For instance, the first Mexican constitution 
of 1824 devised a mechanism to incorporate 19 formerly separate treasury districts into a 
federal republic.  It was meant to be a compromise between states and ayuntamientos to fund 
the fiscal reorganization of the new federation. Replicating Cadiz article 340 the Mexican 
congress apportioned each state’s contribution by a poorly defined combination of population 
size and consumption, i.e. the Contingente. The political bargaining was extremely difficult 
and returns soon foundered, constituting 24% of federal revenues in 1824 and originated in 
the same mining regions that had formerly transferred large shares of their revenues to the 
colonial capital, but without vote or voice (Arroyo 2006). It fell to 10% in the following years 
and collapsed further to 3% in 1831 when contributions ceased; meanwhile total revenues of 
the federal government nearly halved. Conversely, in the US when war expenses created 
extra needs, as in 1812, the federal government could temporarily levy an extraordinary 
federal property tax on states on the basis of population to great effect.  Underpinning the 
failure of Mexican fiscal federalism – comparable with other experiments in Spanish America 
- was the protracted conflict regarding the sources of national revenues and the form of the 
state.  
 
In the process, restrictions to suffrage mounted with wealth and literacy requirements 
throughout Spanish America; elections evolved into a form of proclamation of every new 
government rather than an actually organized and fair competition for power. The early open 
contest for the popular will soon ran out of funds; henceforth governments traded 
entitlements for support. Political strife moved from the ballots to the battleground, and 
further to the streets. Suffrage lost its nature. With ad hoc elections representative democracy 
in Spanish America moved one step towards what scholars calls a ‘Delegative Democracy’ 
(O'Donnell 1994) as opposed to a representative one.  In this environment there were no 
effective means to fund governance and far less to deliver the constitutional promises of 
public education.  As governments resorted to even more perverse means to defray expenses, 
such as liquidating massive tracts of public land when relative price was rising from greater 
labour ratios and higher prices for land intensive commodities from globalization, 
governments only accelerated already high levels of inequality. Thus in 19
th
 century Spanish 
America – and in Spain- inequality is the by-product of an institutional legacy other than 
colonial status.  Elites, on the other hand, managed to deter both greater fiscal extraction from 
governments and institutional demands for political redistribution from fellow citizens. Fiscal 
reforms were ineffectual or null and representation was increasingly more restrictive. Low 
taxation was in their interest as they could acquire public goods privately. For the masses the 
expectation – and experience- of public provision of private goods put governments in the 
position of continuous patronage in order to buy out their legitimacy, irrespective of the 
financial means available. Insolvency, inflation and instability are long term features in these 
countries, together with regressive fiscal policies.  Placing the fiscal burden on others or in 
the future brought elites and masses together in a perverse combination of low taxation and 
representation. This intertemporal trap of the peculiar Latin American political and 
macroeconomic (dis)equilibrium seems to be indeed more a legacy of the 19
th
 century.  
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Sardá Dexeus, J. (1947). "Spanish Prices in the Nineteenth Century." The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 62(1): 143-159. 
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